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Across five experiments, we show that dehumanization—the act of
perceiving victims as not completely human—increases instrumen-
tal, but not moral, violence. In attitude surveys, ascribing reduced
capacities for cognitive, experiential, and emotional states to victims
predicted support for practices where victims are harmed to achieve
instrumental goals, including sweatshop labor, animal experimen-
tation, and drone strikes that result in civilian casualties, but not
practices where harm is perceived as morally righteous, including
capital punishment, killing in war, and drone strikes that kill terror-
ists. In vignette experiments, using dehumanizing compared with
humanizing language increased participants’ willingness to harm
strangers for money, but not participants’ willingness to harm
strangers for their immoral behavior. Participants also spontane-
ously dehumanized strangers when they imagined harming them
for money, but not when they imagined harming them for their
immoral behavior. Finally, participants humanized strangers who
were low in humanity if they imagined harming them for immoral
behavior, but not money, suggesting that morally motivated perpe-
trators may humanize victims to justify violence against them. Our
findings indicate that dehumanization enables violence that perpe-
trators see as unethical, but instrumentally beneficial. In contrast,
dehumanization does not contribute to moral violence becausemor-
ally motivated perpetrators wish to harm complete human beings
who are capable of deserving blame, experiencing suffering, and
understanding its meaning.
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The failure to recognize other people as fellow human beings isconsidered to be a fundamental enabler of violence across
cultures and throughout history (1–4). Known as dehumanization,
this process is thought to have allowed colonists to exterminate
indigenous peoples as if they were insects and whites to own blacks
as if they were property (5–7). The dehumanization hypothesis
developed amid theories arguing that violence is motivated pri-
marily by instrumental gain or impulsive reactions, and that a
greater appreciation of our shared humanity would lead to more
peaceful relations (8–10). Although these theories differ in focus,
collectively they assume that violence is restrained in part by a
sense of moral obligation and sympathy toward fellow human be-
ings, whom we feel are entitled to rights and protections that
prohibit violence against them. In this framework, dehumanization
causes perpetrators to perceive victims as nonhuman and, there-
fore, not entitled to moral obligation or sympathy, thus enabling
perpetrators to act out their violent impulses free of inhibition and
without remorse (11–15).
The basic premise on which the dehumanization hypothesis
depends—that violence is restrained by moral inhibitions against
harming fellow human beings—is in flux. Recent ethnographic and
historical analyses, and classical works on the evolution of co-
operation and the sociology of crime, indicate that descriptively,
many perpetrators feel their violence is righteous and that their
victims deserve what is coming to them. The husband who avenges
the murder of his wife, the vigilante who cripples criminals, the
soldier who kills the enemy, the public that votes for capital pun-
ishment, and even the suicide terrorist who detonates a bomb– all
may see violence as morally justified, obligatory, and even praise-
worthy (16–23). Meanwhile, recent philosophical analyses have
argued that the logic of dehumanization is inconsistent with per-
petrators’ actions. Specifically, the failure to recognize someone’s
humanity predicts indifference toward their suffering, not an active
desire to bring that suffering about. Perpetrators should feel no
need to humiliate, rape, and torture their victims, to force them to
watch each other suffer, to conduct show trials, or to claim to their
victims that the violence being done to them is morally laudatory
(10, 24–26). At the same time, research on attribution and moral
judgment has found that moral blame is directed toward people
who plan and intend their actions, who have greater control and
ability, and who understand why they are being harmed, all of
which would seem to require recognition of human capacity (27–
29). Even the American justice system imposes lighter sentences on
individuals who lack these capacities, including minors, people with
mental disabilities, and the criminally insane (30). Taken together,
these findings indicate that our sense of morality does not only
inhibit violence, it may also impel violence against victims recog-
nized as fellow human beings. If so, the role of dehumanization in
violence is unclear, as moral violence may not be driven by the
weakening of moral inhibitions, but rather by the strengthening of
moral motives.
Here, we theorize that morally motivated perpetrators wish to
harm victims who deserve it, can experience it fully, and understand
its meaning. To do so, their victims must be capable of thinking and
having intentions, feeling pain and other sensations, and experi-
encing moral emotions—they must be human. Therefore, we hy-
pothesize that perpetrators should feel no need to dehumanize
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victims when their violence is motivated by moral sentiments. If
confirmed, the moral violence hypothesis would suggest the exis-
tence of two discrete forms of violence: one experienced as morally
objectionable but nonetheless desirable for instrumental reasons
(instrumental violence), and another motivated by moral senti-
ments that require violence despite any moral inhibitions against it
(moral violence). According to this hypothesis, dehumanization
enables instrumental violence by weakening moral inhibitions that
would otherwise restrain it, thus making perpetrators apathetic to
victims’ suffering. In contrast, dehumanization cannot cause moral
violence because it would strip victims of the qualities that neces-
sitated the violence in the first place. Support for this hypothesis
would demonstrate the importance of examining moral violence as
a distinct form of violence that makes unique predictions and
cannot be analyzed through the lens of previous theories.
Defining Dehumanization and Moral and Instrumental
Violence
To explain violent practices, measures of dehumanization often
combine the denial of human attributes with the addition of neg-
atively valenced attributes. Thus, they operationalize dehumaniza-
tion as the willingness to describe victims as animals, apes, and
worms (31–33); as individuals who are superficial, cold, un-
sophisticated, and unrefined (34, 35); or as individuals who elicit
contempt and disgust (36). The advantage of this approach is that it
accounts for a wide range of violent phenomena. The disadvantage
is that in attributing violent acts to dehumanization, these measures
struggle to experimentally disentangle the removal of human at-
tributes from the addition of negative attributes, or to establish
dehumanization as a construct distinct from animosity or moral
outrage (1). Rather than reflecting failed human perception, it is
possible that when perpetrators describe victims in animalistic,
disgusting, or other negative terms, their aim is to degrade and
exert dominance over someone whom they know is human and
wishes to be identified as such (10, 25, 26).
To overcome these limitations, we define dehumanization strictly
as the failure to engage in social cognition of other human minds
(37–39). From this perspective, what makes someone human is the
existence of an “inner life” comprised of particular cognitive and
emotional states and sensations (40, 41). Specifically, we define
dehumanization in terms of capacities for agency (e.g., intending,
planning, reasoning, remembering), experience (e.g., pain, hunger,
fear, pleasure), and counterbalanced positive and negative moral
emotions (e.g., love, compassion, anger, hatred) (42, 43). In line
with previous research, we do not directly measure ascriptions of
“humanness,” as such abstract, global measures have been found to
be more susceptible to contextual biases and demand characteristics
than measures of specific attributes (44). This approach may not
capture all violent acts to which the term “dehumanization” has
colloquially been applied. Indeed, we theorize that many violent
practices that have been attributed to dehumanization are
actually driven by different psychological mechanisms. In addi-
tion, it is possible that the human “essence” compromised by
dehumanization cannot be assessed through measures of specific
human attributes (45). However, to the extent that measures of
specific human attributes do capture dehumanization, our ap-
proach isolates the denial of human attributes from the addition
of negative attributes and provides a theoretically grounded
scientific definition from which to identify the distinct psycho-
logical mechanisms that give rise to violence.
Regarding our distinction between moral and instrumental vio-
lence, there is considerable disagreement as to what constitutes a
“moral” judgment and whether it has any unifying features (46). In
addition, some violent acts may be characterized by both moral and
instrumental features. In our experiments, instrumental violence is
intended to refer to cases that are primarily characterized by per-
petrators who do not necessarily desire to harm victims, but who
knowingly harm them in order to achieve some other objective.
Meanwhile, moral violence is intended to refer to cases that are
primarily characterized by perpetrators who harm victims because
they see them as deserving of it.
Overview of Experiments
To test our hypothesis that dehumanization increases instrumental,
but not moral, violence, we conducted five experiments. Experi-
ments 1 and 2 use attitude surveys to investigate whether natural
variation in dehumanizing attitudes toward victims predicts support
for instrumental, but not moral, violence in political and intergroup
contexts. Experiment 3 uses a vignette-based experimental design
to provide causal evidence for our hypothesis by investigating
whether describing strangers in dehumanized terms increases
willingness to harm them for instrumental, but not moral, reasons.
Experiment 4 examines the reverse causal pathway by investigating
whether people spontaneously dehumanize strangers when they
imagine harming them for instrumental, but not moral, reasons.
Finally, Experiment 5 extends our hypothesis by investigating
whether people spontaneously humanize strangers who are severely
lacking in human attributes when they imagine harming them for
moral, but not instrumental, reasons.
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1 (n = 187), we drew on previous research on active
and passive aggression (47) to present participants with either two
instrumental violence practices or two moral violence practices.
Participants in the instrumental condition were asked to state their
level of approval for purchasing goods made in sweatshops and the
use of animals in experiments (Fig. 1A). In these cases, we theo-
rized that people instrumentally benefit from, but do not actively
desire to harm, sweatshop laborers and laboratory animals. Dehu-
manization should predict greater support for these instrumental
violence practices. Participants in the moral conditions were asked
to state their level of approval for capital punishment of mur-
derers and killing enemy soldiers in war. Although these cases
have some instrumental features, we theorized that people actively
desire to harm murderers and enemy soldiers because they feel
these groups morally deserve it. Dehumanization should be un-
related to these moral violence practices. After participants
expressed their level of approval, we measured dehumanizing at-
titudes by asking participants to assess victims’ abilities to have
intentions and make plans (agency), to experience pain and suf-
fering (experience), to feel love and compassion, and anger
and hate.
Perceiving less humanity in sweatshop laborers and laboratory
animals predicted greater approval for the use of sweatshop labor
and experiments on animals (r = −0.39, P < 0.001). In contrast,
perceiving less humanity in murderers and enemy soldiers did not
predict approval for capital punishment of murderers and killing in
war (r = −0.01, P = 0.887). The two relationships were significantly
different from each other (z = 2.65, P = 0.008). Support for in-
strumental violence was significantly negatively correlated with all
four mental state measures, including agency (r = −0.41, P <
0.001), experience (r = −0.35, P < 0.001), love and compassion
(r = −0.29, P = 0.004), and anger and hatred (r = −0.27, P = 0.009).
In contrast, support for moral violence was not related to any of the
individual mental state measures. Participants expressed greater
approval for capital punishment and killing in war (M = 4.25, SD =
1.70) than for sweatshop labor and animal experimentation (M =
2.65, SD = 1.19; t = 7.45, P < 0.001), and they ascribed marginally
greater humanity toward murderers and enemy soldiers (M = 4.62,
SD = 0.49) than toward sweatshop laborers and animals (M = 4.48,
SD = 0.58; t = 1.85, P = 0.066).
Experiment 2
Whereas the results of Experiment 1 support the moral violence
hypothesis, the violent practices examined in the experiment vary
on several dimensions, including the nature of the violence being
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committed. In addition, it was never confirmed whether participants
viewed the violent acts as differing on instrumental and moral
dimensions as theorized. In contrast, in Experiment 2 (n = 101),
we assessed support for a single violent practice—military drone
strikes—while framing the practice either around recipients of
instrumental violence or recipients of moral violence (Fig. 1B). In
the instrumental condition, we framed drone strikes around col-
lateral damage to Iraqi civilians, and then measured support for
drone strikes and humanity ascribed to Iraqi civilians. Although
drone strikes may be perceived as utilitarian action directed to-
ward a moral good of defeating terrorism, the Iraqi civilians are
innocent and undeserving of harm, and so we theorized that in
relation to the civilians specifically, the action is instrumental
rather than moral. If participants do not actively wish to kill Iraqi
civilians, but require them to die as a means to killing terrorists,
then dehumanization should predict support for drone strikes. In
the moral condition, we framed drone strikes around deaths to
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) terrorists, and then
measured support for drone strikes and humanity ascribed to
terrorists. If participants actively desire to harm terrorists because
they feel they morally deserve it, then dehumanization should be
unrelated to support for drone strikes.
We first conducted a pilot study to confirm that participants view
drone strikes framed around deaths to ISIS terrorists as more
strongly reflecting moral violence and drone strikes framed around
collateral damage to Iraqi civilians as more strongly reflecting in-
strumental violence. We found that participants (n = 96) rated
drone strikes framed around deaths to ISIS terrorists as signifi-
cantly more moral (M = 3.95, SD = 1.16) than instrumental (M =
2.65, SD = 1.35; t = 6.22, P < 0.001), while they rated drone strikes
framed around collateral damage to Iraqi civilians as significantly
more instrumental (M = 4.09, SD = 0.87) than moral (M = 2.14,
SD = 1.18; t = 11.98, P < 0.001).
Regarding the main results from Experiment 2, perceiving less
humanity in Iraqi civilians predicted more approval for drone
strikes (r = −0.34, P = 0.016). In contrast, perceiving less humanity
in terrorists did not predict approval for drone strikes (r = 0.11, P =
0.452). The two relationships were significantly different from each
other (z = 2.25, P = 0.024). Consistent with prior studies that ma-
nipulate dehumanization by varying moral behavior (44, 45), Iraqi
civilians were seen as more human overall (M = 4.83, SD = 0.42)
than ISIS terrorists (M = 4.45, SD = 0.51; t = 4.05, P < 0.001). This
effect was driven by greater perceptions of capacities for love and
compassion in Iraqi civilians (M = 4.78, SD = 0.74) than in ISIS
terrorists (M = 3.65, SD = 1.23; t = 5.60, P < 0.001). However,
support for drone strikes framed around deaths to ISIS terrorists
was not related to dehumanization along any dimension, including
love and compassion, and was marginally positively correlated with
capacities for anger and hate (r = 0.25, P = 0.077). In contrast,
support for drone strikes framed around deaths to Iraqi civilians
was significantly negatively correlated with perceptions of capacities
for experience (r = −0.44, P = 0.001) and love and compassion
(r = −0.41, P = 0.003). As would be expected, participants expressed
greater approval for drone strikes when framed around deaths to
terrorists (M = 4.69, SD = 1.82) than when framed around deaths
to civilians (M = 2.72, SD = 1.86; t = 7.45, P < 0.001).
Experiment 3
Experiments 1 and 2 used natural variation in dehumanization to
demonstrate that dehumanization is related to instrumental, but
not moral, violence. Although these experiments provide external
validity for the moral violence hypothesis, they do not provide
causal evidence for it. Also, the higher approval of moral violence
compared with instrumental violence may raise concerns. In Ex-
periments 3–5, we use hypothetical vignette-based experiments to
manipulate levels of dehumanization and motives to aggress, and
more closely equate support for instrumental and moral violence.
In Experiment 3 (n = 363), we experimentally manipulated de-
humanization and motives to aggress by describing a stranger in
humanized or dehumanized terms and then assessing participants’
willingness to harm the stranger for instrumental or moral reasons
in a hypothetical scenario (Fig. 2). Participants were presented with
a vignette in which they were told to imagine they had the op-
portunity to anonymously break a stranger’s thumb. Participants’
motives were manipulated by either telling participants that they
would be paid $2 million to do it (instrumental motive), or by
telling participants that the stranger recruited poor young women
into prostitution (moral motive). To manipulate dehumanization,
we drew on previous research that identified personality traits that
are seen as highly humanizing, but which are counterbalanced for
positive and negative valence. Specifically, in the humanized con-
dition, the stranger was described as a 29-year-old man with brown
hair and brown eyes named John, who is “ambitious and imagi-
native, but also high-strung and insecure”, whereas in the
dehumanized condition, the stranger was simply described as a
“man” (48, 49). Participants then rated their willingness to break
the stranger’s thumb and assessed the stranger’s mental states.
Participants were significantly more likely to report that they
would break the stranger’s thumb for money when he was described
in dehumanized (M = 4.64, SD = 2.14) rather than humanized
terms (M = 3.90, SD = 2.36; t = 2.26, P = 0.025). In contrast,
participants were no more likely to report that they would break the
stranger’s thumb for immoral behavior when he was described in
dehumanized (M = 4.04, SD = 2.37) rather than humanized terms
(M = 4.13, SD = 2.24; t = 0.245, P = 0.807). A two-way ANOVA
analysis revealed a marginally significant interaction [F(1, 360) =
2.97, P = 0.086, η2 =0.008].
Fig. 1. Correlation plots displaying approval of vio-
lence and humanity of victims. (A) Approval of sweat-
shop labor and animal experimentation (instrumental
violence) and approval of killing enemy soldiers in war
and executing murderers (moral violence). (B) Approval
of drone strikes framed around deaths to civilians and
around deaths to terrorists. Each data point may
represent several participants. Color of data points
represent the type of violence the majority of those
participants were responding.

























Experiment 3 provided causal evidence that when strangers are
dehumanized, participants are more likely to support instrumental,
but not moral, violence against them. In Experiment 4 (n = 352),
we examined the reverse causal pathway by investigating whether
consideration of violence to strangers for instrumental, but not
moral, reasons would lead participants to spontaneously de-
humanize them (Fig. 3A). Participants in two experimental con-
ditions were presented with a vignette in which they were asked to
imagine harming a stranger either for money or for immoral be-
havior. Participants in two control conditions were provided with
matched vignettes, but were not asked to imagine harm. After
reading the vignettes, all participants assessed the stranger’s
humanity.
Participants who imagined harming a stranger for money (M =
3.91, SD = 0.87) perceived the stranger as significantly less human
than participants who did not imagine harming the stranger for
money (M = 4.46, SD = 0.63; t = 5.05, P < 0.001). In contrast,
participants who imagined harming an immoral stranger (M = 3.98,
SD = 0.80) perceived the stranger as marginally more human than
participants who did not imagine harming the immoral stranger
(M = 3.78, SD = 0.67; t = 1.75, P = 0.082). A two-way ANOVA
analysis revealed a significant interaction [F(1, 349) = 22.59, P <
0.001, η2 = 0.061].
Experiment 5
Experiments 1–4 demonstrated that dehumanization predicts,
causes, and is caused by instrumental, but not moral, violence. In
the final experiment, we extend our thesis to hypothesize that when
victims have strongly reduced human attributes, morally motivated
perpetrators may be motivated to humanize victims to make their
moral violence meaningful (23). To do so, we drew on previous
research that found that people are ascribed reduced human at-
tributes when they are unconscious (50). Thus, in Experiment 5
(n = 362), we presented participants with the same experimental
design from Experiment 4, except we told them that the stranger
whom they were considering harming was asleep (Fig. 3B). We
predicted that when imagining harming the sleeping stranger for
money, participants would feel no motivation to dehumanize the
stranger further if the stranger was already lacking in humanity. In
contrast, when imagining harming the sleeping stranger for im-
moral behavior, they would humanize the stranger to imbue the
stranger with the humanity necessary to make moral violence
meaningful.
No difference in perceived humanity was found between par-
ticipants who imagined harming the stranger for money (M = 2.99,
SD = 1.04) and participants who did not imagine harming the
stranger for money (M = 2.85, SD = 0.99; t = 0.976, P = 0.331). In
contrast, participants who imagined harming the immoral stranger
(M = 3.60, SD = 0.95) perceived the stranger as significantly more
human than participants who did not imagine harming the immoral
stranger (M = 2.98, SD = 0.89; t = 4.50, P < 0.001). A two-way
ANOVA analysis revealed a significant interaction [F(1, 359) =
5.48, P = 0.020, η2 = 0.015]. These results indicate that when
perceived humanity is especially low, consideration of moral, but
not instrumental, violence causes humanization of victims. Given
that Experiments 1–4 found that instrumental violence was linked
to dehumanization, whereas moral violence was not linked to any
significant effects, one possibility is that there is a threshold effect
to dehumanization, such that once victims are seen as sufficiently
human, further humanization is unnecessary to sustain or generate
moral violence, whereas once victims are sufficiently dehumanized,
further dehumanization is unnecessary to sustain or generate instru-
mental violence.
Discussion
Harming another human being can be extraordinarily difficult and
traumatic, but sometimes necessary or advantageous. One path to
successfully committing violence is to disengage our moral inhibi-
tions by dehumanizing victims, so that it no longer feels distressing
to inflict pain on others (4, 45). However, a second path to suc-
cessfully committing violence is to strengthen our moral motives to
harm so that we can overcome, rather than disengage, any aversion
to violence. Across five experiments, we provide external validity
and causal evidence to indicate that dehumanization increases vio-
lence committed for instrumental, but not moral, reasons, and that
consideration of instrumental, but not moral, violence causes de-
humanization of victims. Morally motivated perpetrators may even
humanize victims when it is necessary to generate moral meaning
for the violence they do. The failure to recognize victims as fellow
human beings does not make people desire to aggress, it simply
makes them apathetic to victims’ suffering when committing vio-
lence in pursuit of instrumental ends. When in pursuit of moral
ends however, dehumanizing victims does not lead to violence, nor
does violence lead to dehumanization, because dehumanization
removes the very qualities that make moral violence meaningful.
These findings seem to run counter to the literature that has
linked dehumanization to willingness to punish, torture, rape, and
kill out-groups, women, and minorities (51–54). In this tradition,
even our enemies and other “thin” relations must be perceived as
human to prevent excessive violence toward them (55). Method-
ologically, the key differences between our findings and previous
experimental results is that we operationalized dehumanization in
terms of perceiving victims’ minds rather than attributing ani-
malistic or negative characteristics to them, and we distinguished
moral from instrumental violence. The distinction between moral
and instrumental violence has surface similarities with the dual
model of dehumanization that distinguishes between “mechanis-
tic” dehumanization, which is thought to cause instrumental vio-
lence in interpersonal contexts, and “animalistic” dehumanization,
which is thought to cause “antagonistic” violence in intergroup
contexts (2). However, that model would predict that instrumental
and moral violence are driven by dehumanization along different
mental state dimensions in different contexts. Instead, we found
that dehumanization never predicted moral violence, it never
caused moral violence, and it was never caused by moral violence
in interpersonal or intergroup contexts.
One potential limitation of our method is that in practice, when
perpetrators compare victims to animals, they may not only fail to
perceive their victims’minds, they may imbue them with savage and
contaminating attributes that are insulting and threatening to the
perpetrators’ sense of social hierarchy and in-group essence (1, 2).
Perpetrators may also be morally conflicted or motivated by moral
and instrumental reasons simultaneously. They may also engage in
selective dehumanization, denying some human attributes while
Fig. 2. Mean rating of willingness to harm a stranger as a function of in-
strumental or moral motive and whether the stranger was described in hu-
manizing or dehumanizing language. Error bars represent one SEM.
8514 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1705238114 Rai et al.
upholding others. Each of these considerations raises issues re-
garding how researchers should conceptualize dehumanization
moving forward. Nevertheless, our research reveals the existence of
two distinct psychological processes tied to two discrete kinds of
violence—in the first case, removing human attributes so that per-
petrators and observers become apathetic to victims’ welfare and
can proceed with instrumental violence unimpeded by guilt or
empathy, and in the second case, generating feelings of hostility and
moral impetus to harm directly.
Our findings are as important as moral violence is prevalent.
Many theories of moral psychology have argued that prohibitions
against intentional harm form the core of our sense of morality,
and incidents of violence can only be explained as undesirable but
instrumentally necessary, or as failures to live up to our moral
obligations (56–58). These moral psychological theories are mu-
tually supported by most theories of violence, which assume that
violence is primarily pursued for instrumental or impulsive reasons
and restrained by our sense of moral obligation. Even when these
theories consider “retaliatory” or “justice”motives, they are seen as
either impulsive actions that perpetrators would not support upon
reflection or as additional forms of utility that should not exhibit
unique patterns (8, 59). Dehumanization has bound these various
approaches together by arguing that violence is enabled when we
fail to perceive our victims as fellow human beings worthy of
moral concern.
However, ethnographic and historical evidence suggest other-
wise. Police who abuse suspects, gangs that violently protect their
turf, terrorists who commit suicide bombings, brothers who kill
their sisters to cleanse family dishonor—all see their violence as
morally justified, obligatory, and even virtuous (17). The perva-
siveness of moral violence indicates that our findings are important,
and in turn, our findings provide evidence that moral violence is
fundamental. Its patterns cannot be understood or accurately
predicted by theories that focus on prohibitions against harm, in-
strumental or impulsive motives for violence, or the failure to
recognize the humanity of victims. Instead, our findings suggest that
paradigms of moral psychology, violence, and dehumanization must
shift toward a conceptualization of violence wherein its aim is often
to intentionally aggress against complete human beings capable of
deserving, suffering, and understanding the harm done to them.
In our new framework, combating dehumanization is still critical
to reducing violence, but in a different manner than previously
thought. Our findings suggest that when the Nazis compared Jews
to rats in World War II, its primary effect may not have been to
fuel the hatred of Nazi officials, but rather to reduce the sympathy
felt by the German public toward the Jews being persecuted. Thus,
dehumanization makes possible the everyday violence and large-
scale atrocities that observers enable through their indifference. It
allows us to refuse to help and to sacrifice others for the greater
good because we are apathetic to their suffering (60, 61). It un-
dermines reconciliation following conflict because there is no point
to rebuilding relationships with those we think of as animals (55,
62). It also still enables the perpetuation of atrocities committed
for instrumental gain through colonization, slavery, and other
practices.
However, it does not cause morally motivated violence directly.
At a time when Americans are enacting a ban on immigration from
several Muslim majority countries, our findings suggest that there
are two distinct psychological mechanisms at work. What enables
the impulse is a mechanism of neglect caused by dehumanization of
Muslim refugees who are mentally conceptualized as less than
human. However, what drives the impulse is a mechanism of moral
outrage directed toward terrorists who may be conceptualized as
completely human. As Manne (10) notes in her description of
Elliot Rodgers’mass shooting in Isla Vista, CA, in 2014, he claimed
that he was punishing sorority women for not noticing him and
“throwing themselves” at other men as part of his “revenge against
humanity.”His awareness of women’s capacities to think, feel, love,
and choose did not defuse his outrage—it created it. The current
research demonstrates that if we ever wish to fully understand
violence, we cannot only study the breakdown of mechanisms that
promote peace, we must also examine the moral motives that impel
us to aggress in the first place.
Materials and Methods
Participants in all experiments were recruited via the Internet and compensated
with $0.25 following completion of a questionnaire administered through the
Mechanical Turk site run by Amazon.com. It has been found that data collected
from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk site is as reliable as data gathered through
traditional methods (63). All participants were drawn from the United States.
The IP addresses of participants’ computers were recorded to ensure that they
did not participate in the study multiple times. Participants in all experiments
were assigned to conditions randomly. Participants in all experiments reported
demographic information including their political orientation, age, sex, eth-
nicity, and education level. Although women expressed less support for violence
than men overall, no consistent meaningful interactions were predicted or
found between the demographic variables and analyses of interest, and so
those analyses are not reported in the paper. Participants in all experiments
were also asked to guess our hypotheses. None succeeded. Participants in all
experiments began by reading a short prompt about violence (SI Appendix).
The Institutional Review Board at Northwestern University’s Office for Research
approved all research conducted in these experiments. Informed consent was
obtained from all participants before participation in the experiments.
Experiments 1 and 2 used between-subjects designs. Participants first rated
their approval of violent practices and then assessed humanity. Humanity items
were rated on five-point likert scales ranging from 1 (not capable at all) to 5
(completely capable) and were counterbalanced for order (SI Appendix). In
Experiment 1, participants in the “moral violence” condition reported the ex-
tent to which they approved of “executing murderers” and “killing enemy
soldiers in a time of war” and assessed the humanity of “murderers” and
“enemy soldiers,” whereas participants in the “instrumental violence” condi-
tion reported the extent to which they approved of “purchasing products that
are made in so-called ‘sweatshops’ overseas” and “conducting experiments on
animals”, and assessed the humanity of “people who work in sweatshops” and
“animals.” In Experiment 2, participants in the “moral violence” condition
reported the extent to which they approved of “drone strikes that result in the
deaths of ISIS terrorists” and assessed the humanity of “ISIS terrorists,” whereas
participants in the “instrumental violence” condition reported the extent to
Fig. 3. Mean rating of the humanity of strangers as a
function of motive and whether participants imagined
harming the stranger. (A) When the stranger is awake.
(B) When the stranger is asleep. Error bars represent
one SEM.
























which they approved of “drone strikes that result in collateral damage to in-
nocent Iraqi civilians” and assessed the humanity of “Iraqi civilians.”
In the pilot study for Experiment 2, participants were presented with a
distinction between two kinds of violence, one in which “perpetrators do not
necessarily desire to harm victims, but they knowingly do so in order to achieve
some other objective, such as selfish gain or even a greater moral good,” and a
second kind of violence in which “victims are harmed because they see them as
morally deserving of it.” Participants were then asked to rate the extent to
which drone strikes framed around deaths to ISIS terrorists and collateral
damage to Iraqi civilians were similar to each of the two kinds of violence on a
five-point likert scale ranging from 1 (not similar at all) to 5 (completely sim-
ilar). The two types of violence were not labeled as instrumental or moral.
Items were counterbalanced for order.
Experiment 3 used a between-subjects design. After reading the vignettes (SI
Appendix), participants rated their willingness to “physically break the man’s
thumb” for either the instrumental or moral reason provided on a seven-point
likert scale ranging from 1 (not willing at all) to 7 (completely willing).
Experiments 4 and 5 used between-subjects designs. Participants in the
instrumental conditions were asked to imagine a typical stranger they
might encounter in everyday life (SI Appendix). Participants in the moral
conditions were asked to further imagine that the person is “evil and
enjoys making other people suffer.” Participants in the experimental
conditions were asked to imagine pricking the stranger’s index finger
with a pin, either in exchange for $10 or as punishment for their immo-
rality. After reading the vignettes, participants rated the stranger’s hu-
manity by using similar likert scales to those used in Experiments 1 and 2
(SI Appendix).
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